







EXAMINING THE FBI’S EARLY INSTITUTIONAL HISTORY ON INTER-AGENCY 
INTELLIGENCE SHARING: A COMPARATIVE ANALYSIS OF COOPERATION WITHIN 

















A research study submitted to Johns Hopkins University in conformity with the requirements for the 















© 2021 Claudia Hammond 










 This research study addresses the issue of cooperation within the United States 
Intelligence Community in the early years of the Cold War, particularly 1947-1969. This study 
conducts a comparative analysis on the formation and operation of three intelligence community 
members during this era: The Central Intelligence Agency, the Defense Intelligence Agency, and 
National Security Agency, to the Federal Bureau of Investigation.  
This paper explores the establishment of the Federal Bureau of Investigation and the 
issues surrounding its various mission sets, primarily focusing on issues relating to national 
security. In comparing the agencies, I examine whether the Central Intelligence Agency, the 
Defense Intelligence Agency, and National Security Agency, experienced similar or different 
issues as the Federal Bureau of Investigation in cooperation, intelligence sharing, collaboration, 
communication, and trust during the early years of each organization. In the analysis section, I 
examine each agency’s inception rationale, intended mission(s), early case work, and external 
cooperation, and compare them to those of the Federal Bureau of Investigation.   
Finally, this research study highlights the structural and contextual similarities and 
differences between the three agencies and the Federal Bureau of Investigation. In doing so, I 
identify which variables fostered inter-agency cooperation and which variables caused inter-
agency friction. This study concludes that although the Federal Bureau of Investigation shared 
similar difficulties as the Central Intelligence Agency, the Defense Intelligence Agency, and 
National Security Agency, it disproportionately struggled to cooperate, collaborate, 
communicate, and gain the trust of other agencies. Unlike others, the Federal Bureau of 
Investigation drifted away from the original mission of the organization, resulting in effort 
duplication and competition for dominance in various issue areas. By expanding its operational 
 
 iii 
purview into another agency’s domain, the Federal Bureau of Investigation generated a higher 
degree of friction and ultimately strained its ability to effectively integrate into the Intelligence 
Community. Additionally, J. Edgar Hoover, the director of the Federal Bureau of Investigation, 
generally viewed efforts to collaborate within the United States Intelligence Community as 
counter-productive to advancing the Bureau’s authoritative status within the enterprise of the 
Intelligence Community. Intelligence is often withheld in order to reinforce authority and ensure 
the organization’s relevance. By not accepting the value of other agencies, the FBI in turn did not 
receive reciprocated trust and collaboration. I conclude the Federal Bureau of Investigation, 
between 1947 and 1969, endured far more issues with cooperation compared to others in the 
United States Intelligence Community due to the Bureau’s inability to maintain a mission set, 
desire to achieve power in the establishment, inability to trust other agencies, and opposition to 
open communication.  
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The United States Intelligence Community (USIC) has long been evaluated on its ability 
to protect the American people. This responsibility is shared across many agencies and across 
many mission sets.1 Before September 11, 2001, many commissions, review boards, and leaders 
highlighted the lack of cooperation and communication between organizations. Many questioned 
the source of the disjointedness. I argue that the issue originated long before the Intelligence 
Community (IC) was established.2 Indeed, the Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI), founded in 
1908, is the catalyst of much of the disjointedness.3  
The FBI, formerly known as the Bureau of Investigation (BOI), was formed in the early 
20th century. During this era, the West expanded to far distant territories, with small patches of 
Sheriffs patrolling large swaths of land.4 Crime flourished in the far regions, especially land 
fraud.5 Theodore Roosevelt, assumed the presidency in 1901 and had a keen interest in land 
conservation.6 The president turned to his friend, Attorney General Charles J. Bonaparte, in 1908 
to correct the issue of land fraud and abuse.7 At the time, the Secret Service was the only federal 
agency with detective capabilities but Roosevelt “desired that the land frauds be prosecuted 
vigorously.”8 Roosevelt directed Bonaparte “to create an investigative service within the 
Department of Justice subject to no other department or bureau, which would report to no one 
except the Attorney General,” forming “the Bureau of Investigation of the United States 
                                                 
1 Throughout this paper. “mission sets” will refer to the mission, purpose, area of focus, and skill set of particular 
agency.  
2 Throughout this paper, “IC” and “USIC” will be used interchangeably.  
3 Throughout this paper, “FBI” and “Bureau” will be used interchangeably. 
4 Tim Weiner. Enemies: A History of the FBI, (New York: Random House, 2012).  
5 Ibid. 
6 Ibid. 
7 James Findlay, “ Memorandum for the Director: Early History of the Bureau of Investigation, United States 
Department of Justice.” FBI History, November 19, 1943, 
https://web.archive.org/web/20041019232040/http://www.fbi.gov/libref/historic/history/historic_doc/findlay.htm.  
8 Ibid.  
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Department of Justice.”9 On July 26, 1908, Bonaparte released a memo officially creating the 
BOI and the formation of a department staffed with special agents to assist in investigative cases 
on behalf of the Justice Department.10  
The Bureau encountered an identity crisis early in its infancy. In the beginning years, the 
agency continued to investigate land fraud; however, in a few short years, the organization 
slowly expanded its mission set, focusing on white slave trade and prostitution.11 When World 
War I commenced in 1914, the BOI was redirected to an entirely different area: undercover 
spies.12 The FBI worked alongside the Office of Naval Intelligence (ONI) in uncovering spies in 
the United States.13 Once World War I concluded, the BOI did not return to its original mission 
set but desired to remain in the world of intelligence.14 In the post-war era, the fear of a 
Bolshevik revolution spread across Europe and eventually to the United States. While the 
organization continued to practice law enforcement, Hoover argued that the threat of 
Communism remained and intensified, in an attempt to solidify its involvement in foreign 
intelligence.15 In March 1919, a Senate sub-committee investigating Communists in the United 
States spread fear and panic across the country about undercover spies.16 In 1919, J. Edgar 
Hoover, a young BOI employee, was appointed as the head of the Radical Division in the Justice 
Department, an arm of the government who sought to find American radicals, Communists, and 
foreign spies.17 As the Radical Division gained notoriety, J. Edgar Hoover was appointed as the 
                                                 
9 Ibid.  
10 “A Brief History: The Nation Calls, 1908-1923.” FBI. https://www.fbi.gov/history/brief-history.  
11 Findlay,“ Memorandum for the Director” 
12 Ibid.  
13 Weiner, Enemies: A History of the FBI. 
14 Ibid. 
15 Ibid. 
16 Abram Brown, “The First Red Scare: March 22, 1919,” Forbes 4, no. 30 (2018), 
http://search.ebscohost.com/login.aspx?direct=true&AuthType=ip,shib&db=bsu&AN=129459936&site=ehost-
live&scope=site&authtype=ip,shib&custid=s3555202.  
17 Weiner, Enemies: A History of the FBI. 
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director of the BOI in 1924.18 Hoover, upon assuming his new position, continually warned that 
Communism presented the greatest threat to society, leading to the FBI’s era of political 
surveillance and mass deportation.19 Eventually, Hoover utilized foreign spies and foreign 
espionage as an justification to enter the realm of federal intelligence.  
The BOI formally changed its name to the FBI in 1935.20 Beginning in the 1940s and 
peaking during the Cold War, the relationship between the FBI and other agencies began to 
sour.21 Each agency believed they were the only ones capable of uncovering Soviet spies and 
traitors. Competition arose between directors as each directed their resources into the same 
problem and investigated the same subjects with no coordination.22 This phenomenon formulated 
a challenging relationship between agencies as groups withheld information from others to 
preserve their role, battle for funding, and control the intelligence domain.  
The purpose of this research study is to examine the relationship among various 
intelligence agencies in early years of the USIC, particularly 1947- 1969. The paper will 
compare the formation and operation of three IC members, the Central Intelligence Agency 
(CIA), the Defense Intelligence Agency (DIA), and National Security Agency (NSA), to the FBI. 
In comparing the agencies, I will investigate whether the CIA, DIA, and NSA experienced 
similar or different issues as the FBI to include cooperation, intelligence sharing, collaboration, 
communication, and trust. 
Although he crafted the FBI in his vision, Hoover is not the focal point of this research 
study. There are many works discussing the notorious director and analyzing his impact on the 
                                                 
18 Ibid. 
19 Ibid. 
20 Najam Rafique, “Transforming the US Intelligence Community,” Strategic Studies 25, no. 1 (Spring 2005), 
https://doi:10.2307/45242566.  
21 Weiner, Enemies: A History of the FBI. 
22 Ibid.  
 
 4 
organization. To narrow my scope and focus on other causalities and factors occurring in the IC 
and the FBI, I do not go into great detail regarding Hoover’s tenure. Nonetheless, his actions and 
personality are broadly explored. 
For the timeframe of this paper, the IC will consist of the Air Force, Army, CIA, DIA, 
FBI, Navy, National Reconnaissance Office (NRO), and NSA. This paper recognizes the 
National Security Act of 1947 as the first establishment of a national security institution 
consisting of the Army, Air Force, CIA, FBI, Navy, and intelligence oversight positions, with 
DIA, NRO, and NSA forming a few years later.23  
Historiography 
This section explores how the scholarship has developed over the decades regarding the 
FBI and tensions within the IC that may have arose after World War II and into the Cold War. 
The time periods are separated by the years of analysis for this paper, pre-September 11, 2001, 
and post-September 11, 2001.24 It is important to note that almost every source agrees the USIC 
is flawed in some capacity. Authors disagree as to the extent of those problems within the 
enterprise but all note some amount of stress and disjointedness between agencies. Examining 
notable and distinguished authors, the historiography provides an overview of the primary 
discussions.  
Beginning Years: 1947 – 1970 
There are very few sources discussing the FBI within the context of the IC written during 
this era. Agencies were in the process of forming and securing their foothold. Most of the 
activities were classified and hidden from the public. As a result, in-depth analysis and insight 
was largely unavailable to the public. 
                                                 
23 Rafique, “Transforming the US Intelligence Community.” 
24 Throughout this paper, September 11, 2001 will also be referred as “9/11.” 
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In the early years of the USIC, with little available information, the public expressed its 
concern with the number of world events that appeared to be unexpected. Many felt the IC was 
not adequately prepared for or aware of global developments, such as the Sputnik launch. In the 
wake of the concern, journalists and politicians investigated the community. Klaus Knorr 
examines the findings of the 1963 Stennis Report, an investigation into the IC’s failure to 
correctly estimate and track Soviet missiles in Cuba, and discusses the errors between 
organizations.25 He highlights the primary factors leading to inaccuracy, the first being the 
distrust in Cuban sources including refugees and exiles.26 The second and primary factor is the 
USIC’s misunderstanding of Soviet policy and disregard for alternate theories.27 Similar to the 
intelligence shortcomings regarding Pearl Harbor, Knorr argues the IC was incapable of being 
flexible and predicting surprises.28 The lack of changes between significant events underlined the 
fear that the enterprise is not making the necessary reforms to meet the public’s expectations. 
Telford Taylor echoes Knorr’s argument that the IC had been shocked far too many times, to 
include the Korean War, political upheaval in Colombia, and conflict with China.29 Although the 
organization was not immediately successful, Taylor believes the CIA greatly improved its roles 
and responsibilities. Taylor describes the agency as the ultimate solution to the IC’s woes by 
liaising with organizations, professionalizing intelligence, and presenting divergent views.30 The 
greatest threat to the IC, according to Taylor, was the immaturity of the enterprise and the 
                                                 
25 Klaus Knorr, “Failures in National Intelligence Estimates: The Case of the Cuban Missiles,” World Politics 16, 




29 Telford Taylor, “To Improve Our Intelligence System: The 'Silent Service' Needs Continued Support and a 





inability to mass collect.31 Overall, Taylor maintains the IC was promising but continues to 
encounter growing pains and mission overlap.32  
Pre-9/11: 1971 – 2000 
Much more information regarding the USIC was discussed and made available during 
this era. This was primarily due to the CIA’s international presence and allure. Intelligence was 
once seen as a concealed process, clouded with secrecy, but the CIA operated with much more 
visibility due to its unique mission set and alleged covert involvement in major global events. 
Though individuals knew very little of its operations, the intrigue led to more research on the 
agency and the greater IC.  
Thomas Troy, a former CIA operative, shed some insight on the innerworkings of the 
USIC and the CIA. He begins by looking at the creation of the agency, born to resolve the lack 
of coordination during both world wars. The organization was met with stiff opposition by other 
organizations. Troy argues the CIA’s “quick public recognition,” departmental proximity to the 
president, and supervisory role in the IC bred jealousy.33 The agency was prized by the executive 
branch while the others floundered for resources and remained in the shadows, continuing its 
duties with little acknowledgement.34 Troy states the relationship within the IC remains sour.35 
He bluntly states “if there is any sense of community in the intelligence structure, it is in the 
individual agency where people have their careers and place their loyalties.”36 Ultimately, he 
believes there is no sense of togetherness and unity, only a forced intelligence arrangement.37 
                                                 
31 Ibid. 
32 Ibid. 
33 Thomas Troy, “The Quaintness of the U.S. Intelligence Community: Its Origin, Theory, and Problems,” 
International Journal of Intelligence and Counter Intelligence 2, no. 2 (1988): 252, 
https://doi.org/10.1080/08850608808435062.  
34 Ibid.  
35 Ibid. 




Amy Zegart, a famed academic, echoes Troy’s argument that interrelationship failure occurred 
immediately after the creation of the CIA.38 She claims the issues within the USIC originated 
from the CIA’s unnecessary mission to oversee intelligence activities.39 If the agency solely 
focused on covert actions and foreign intelligence, many of the institutional rivalries would not 
exist. Zegart does not blame the agency but rather Congress and the executive branch for 
allowing national security to supersede oversight and careful planning.40 She argues intelligence 
reform commissions are ostentatious actions to convince the public that congressional oversight 
is occurring while not producing any actionable change.41   
Other scholars disagree that 1947, to include the National Security Act and the CIA, 
suddenly created a host of problems among intelligence organizations. Between 1971 and 2000, 
the FBI was under intense investigation by the public. Many newspapers and journals were 
uncovering the problematic practices of the FBI under Hoover’s leadership, such as illegal wire 
taps and hordes of dossier files on political activists and intellectuals. Scholars dove deep into the 
Bureau’s past, examining all aspects of the organization, including its relationship with other 
intelligence agencies. Consequently, the bulk of the scholarship in the era centered around 
Hoover and the FBI. Ray Cline, a former deputy director of the CIA, suggests that many 
struggled to cooperate with Hoover’s FBI, including foreign partners. Under the guidance of 
President Roosevelt, Hoover acted as a liaison with British MI-5 during World War II.42 Cline 
explores why Churchill considered Hoover a disappointment as he did not produce any strategic 
analysis or military estimates.43 Additionally, Hoover solely focused on espionage occurring 
                                                 
38 Amy Zegart, Flawed by Design: The Evolution of the CIA, JSC, and NSC. (Palo Alto: Stanford University Press, 
2000). 
39 Ibid. 
40 Ibid.  
41 Ibid.  




within or near the United States and was indifferent to the threat of espionage around the world 
or in Europe.44 Churchill was also wary of the FBI’s stipulation to not inform other USIC 
agencies of their partnership.45 Cline notes that Roosevelt himself was hesitant to work with 
Hoover due to his known tactic of intimidating politicians by suggesting their after-hours 
behaviors may be recorded in FBI files.46 From a macro-perspective, the FBI actively worked 
against people in government, including other intelligence agencies. Although many view the 
CIA as the instigator for many problems, Cline suggests Hoover and the FBI were the catalyst 
for intelligence siloing and competition before the official creation of the IC.  
Mark Riebling shares a similar conclusion as Cline. According to his analysis, a turf war 
between the FBI and CIA resulted in poor intelligence sharing.47 Akin to Troy, Riebling suggest 
Hoover’s jealousy led to tensions between other agencies. With the major domestic and foreign 
intelligence services not communicating, Riebling argues the two agencies were to blame for 
major events, such as the John F. Kennedy assassination, Iran-Contra affair, and failure to predict 
the fall of the Soviet Union.48 Egos and historical grudges continued through the years and failed 
to be squashed by leadership, politicians, and the executive branch. Though poor behaviors were 
to blame at the individual level, at the systemic level, the USIC allows for information to slip 
through by splitting domestic and foreign intelligence between two distinct agencies.49  
Other scholars also examined the IC through a wider lens. Robert Steele, the former 
Deputy Director of the United States Marine Corps Intelligence Center, looked far beyond the 
                                                 
44 Ibid. 
45 Ibid. 
46 Ibid.  
47 Mark Riebling, Wedge: The Secret War Between the FBI and CIA, (New York, Random House, 1994). 
48 Ibid. 
49 Ibid.  
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internal dynamics of agencies and analyzed the lack of direction and accountability in the IC.50 
Steele saw the failures of the USIC as the lack of clear strategic guidance at the systemic level.51 
He believes some of the intelligence failures that occurred over the decades, such as Vietnam, 
can be attributed to the “excessive emphasis on technical collection, inadequate human and open 
source collection,” all which were left unaddressed by the Community.52 By collecting too much 
extranious information and servicing too many customers, quality intelligence analysis 
decreased. As the IC struggled, directors and politicians continued to ignore the root cause of 
failure.53 Though Steele acknowledges issues in information sharing, he sees it as a small sub-set 
of a much larger issue. He describes the enterprise as a “vast conglomeration of fragmented 
resources” in need of organizational discipline.54   
Post-9/11: 2001 – Present 
Shortly after September 11, 2001, the public was made aware of the USIC’s 
shortcomings in preventing the fateful terrorist attacks. In 2004, the National Commission on 
Terrorist Attacks Upon the United States, also known as the 9/11 Commission, detailed how 
multiple agencies were monitoring various individuals and aspects relating to the attacks but did 
not disseminate the information to others. Many scholars questioned how intelligence sharing 
devolved over the years and how the government failed to address the problem. As a result, there 
was a major influx in scholarship examining the inner and outer workings of the enterprise, 
failures of the system, and recommendations for solutions.  
                                                 
50 Robert Steele, “A Critical Evaluation of U.S. National Intelligence Capabilities.” International Journal of 
Intelligence and Counter Intelligence 6, no. 2 (1993): https://doi.org/10.1080/08850609308435210.  
51 Ibid 
52 Ibid, 173. 




Some scholars studied the relationship between other branches of government and the 
USIC. The issues that occur in the community have been well-documented but the legislative 
and executive branch have allowed the problems to continue. Athan Theoharis examined the IC’s 
continual failed effort to centralize and perform adequate coordination. According to him, 
secrecy was a weapon utilized by each agency to advance its operations and increase its 
authority.55 Special security read-ins and classifications permit agencies to protect its mission 
sets and excuse its lack of coordination, especially the FBI and CIA.56 The more secret an 
operation, the more an agency could work with the president and receive more flexibility to 
conduct questionable and intrusive activities.57 Theoharis argues the IC carried itself as an 
unified enterprise but in actuality the organizations within were fractured. Backroom deals with 
the executive branch decentralized intelligence and created an uncoordinated collection effort.58 
Similar to other authors, Theoharis holds the executive branch and intelligence oversight bodies 
accountable for allowing and encouraging agencies to withhold information and possibly exploit 
the powers of national security for their own gain.59 Likewise, John Gentry, a former CIA 
analyst, explores how policymakers and presidents pressure intelligence agencies. Instead of 
allowing intelligence to inform decisions, individuals pressure the IC to create analysis that 
agrees with their intended action or policy.60 On the other hand, presidents often disregard or 
lack confidence in the intelligence provided.61 Gentry argues this phenomena fractures the IC as 
                                                 
55 Athan Theoharis, The Quest for Absolute Security: The Failed Relations Among U.S. Intelligence Agencies, 










each organization attempts to provide the “correct” answer to appease political pressures.62 
Additionally, intense analysis being ignored is demoralizing for the USIC and results in agencies 
questioning their purpose, threatening the culture of the community.63  
In looking at national security from a broader perspective, there has historically been 
issues with law enforcement and intelligence sharing information.64 Scholars often refer to this 
phenomena as the “Wall”, a “complex arrangement of constitutional principles, statues, policies, 
and practices” that separated the entities.65 Many scholars reason these legal obstacles resulted in 
a series of problems and ultimately 9/11. Katie Martin, however, argues the “Wall” is an 
exaggerated and highly inaccurate metaphor.66 The barriers between law enforcement and 
intelligence, in her opinion, are due to the 1975 Church Committee’s revelation of gross 
government surveillance on civilians.67 The ensuing reforms distinguished the two entities; law 
enforcement investigates wrong-doing and intelligence spies on foreign adversaries.68 Martin 
views the reforms as necessary guidelines, not a barrier, to protect civil liberties and the integrity 
of the intelligence and law enforcement.69 The so-called “Wall” clarified the mission set of the 
two and did not limit communication and collaboration.70  
At the individual and systemic level, Hamilton Bean explores how ‘organizational 
cultures’ have prevented intelligence sharing among agencies.71 The differences between “law 
                                                 
62 Ibid. 
63 Ibid. 
64 Best, Richard, “Sharing Law enforcement and Intelligence Information: The Congressional Role,” Congressional 
Research Service, February 13, 2007. fas.org/sgp/crs/intel/RL33873.pdf.  
65 Ibid, 5. 






71 Hamilton Bean, “Organizational Culture and US Intelligence Affairs,” Intelligence and National Security 24, no. 
4 (August 2009): https://doi.org/10.1080/02684520903069413.   
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enforcement culture,” “military culture,” and “intelligence culture” creates a turf war between 
organizations and congests the flow of information.72 Bean describes culture as “written, spoken, 
material, spatial, temporal, or aesthetic manifestations” that an agency or manager controls.73 
Individuals, he said, view themselves as a member of their agency, not as a member of one group 
– the IC.74 This mentality, formed in the early years of the USIC, created disconnection and 
distinctions among groups of individuals. Rather than coming together with other members to 
create a ‘culture of collaboration’ or a ‘community wide culture’, all remained steadfast in their 
mindset, which continued for decades.75  
Contrary to earlier sources, John Fox, a former analyst and current historian for the FBI, 
praised the collaboration between the military, NSA, and the Bureau. With military intelligence 
focusing on the European theater during World War I, the FBI took the lead as the primary 
homeland intelligence department, pleasing both parties.76 After World War II, the FBI and the 
Army’s signal agency, later known as the NSA, worked together to achieve a handful of 
convictions of Soviet spies inside the United States.77 Regarding foreign intelligence, Fox paints 
a positive picture of all agencies, including the CIA and the military, disseminating intelligence 
and proactively warning about threats.78 He argues the FBI had an integral role in international 
intelligence during the Cold War and frequently acted as a liaison with foreign agencies.79 
Additionally, Fox points to the CIA’s reliance on FBI sources for Soviet intelligence as a 
                                                 
72 Ibid 
73 Ibid, 485. 
74 Ibid. 
75 Ibid.  
76 John Fox, “Intelligence Analysis and the Bureau: The Evolution of Analysis and the Analyst Position in the FBI, 






fundamental partnership.80 The coveted sources produced a wealth of knowledge that was 
disseminated across the IC and filled numerous intelligence gaps.81 Ultimately, Fox provides an 
alternative, somewhat dissenting perspective on the impact of the FBI during the Cold War.   
Methods 
This paper explores the creation of the CIA, NSA, and DIA between 1947 and 1969 and 
the relationship between other IC organizations, with particular emphasis on the FBI. The time 
period and agencies have been deliberately selected. The IC was established in 1947. The end 
date, 1969, was selected for two reasons. The first was to limit the scope of analysis since many 
changes occurred in the IC in the 1970s. Second, there were numerous moments requiring 
collaboration with partners during the early years of the Cold War. The three agencies also 
control a unique mission set and were formed at different times. By examining these three 
organizations, I broadly capture the areas of focus within the USIC before 1970: foreign 
intelligence and espionage, signals collection, and military intelligence. Each section studies the 
rationale behind the agency’s inception, its intended mission, early activity, relationship with 
others, and similarities and differences with the FBI.  
Due to the secretive nature of the USIC, there are some limitations to the research 
process. There is little documentation on the individual level of cooperation between agencies. 
Most revolve around thoughts or observations of the leadership at the time. It is difficult to verify 
their statements on the nature of cooperation. Most importantly, evaluating the agency’s 
intelligence sharing and collaboration, especially with the FBI, is at times judged on the ability 
of senior leadership to work with other high-level members in the IC. Consequently, the level of 
analysis is primarily focused on upper-level management rather than the individual level. 





Classification is another limitation. Not all documents regarding early missions are declassified, 
making it difficult to obtain a complete understanding of the various interactions with other 
organizations.  
Comparative Analysis 
Creation of the Central Intelligence Agency: 1947 
 In the 1940s, the American intelligence system was “primitive and inadequate,” 
according to a senior United States diplomat.82 After ratifying a secret 1939 directive, President 
Franklin Roosevelt assigned most intelligence responsibilities to the FBI, Army’s Military 
Intelligence Division, and ONI.83 During this era, the most vital information was shared through 
an agency’s chain of command.84 Intelligence was rarely distributed to other organizations and 
the president.85 To correct the lack of coordination, President Roosevelt created the Coordinator 
of Information (COI) in 1941, led by General William Donovan, to spur cooperation and 
stimulate the flow of information between the intelligence organizations.86 Once World War II 
commenced and American military capabilities expanded, Roosevelt gave the COI new 
responsibilities in 1942, renaming the organization the Office of Strategic Service (OSS), led by 
Donovan, to “collect and analyze such strategic information” and “plan and operate such special 
services.”87 Under vague guidance and oversight, the OSS initiated clandestine operations, 
espionage, and covert troop support. After the war, the OSS dissolved but its operatives secretly 
continued its activities under various military and State Department divisions.88 In 1946, 
                                                 
82 “The Office of Strategic Services: America's First Intelligence Agency,” Central Intelligence Agency, May 2000, 
https://www.cia.gov/static/7851e16f9e100b6f9cc4ef002028ce2f/Office-of-Strategic-Services.pdf.  
83 Brent Durbin, “The Founding of US Central Intelligence, 1941- 1946,” in The CIA and the Politics of US 
Intelligence Reform, (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2017). 
84 “The Office of Strategic Services.”  
85 Ibid.  
86 Ibid. 
87 Durbin, “The Founding of US Central Intelligence, 1941- 1946.” 
88 Cooke, “Lanes in the Road: Streamlining Intelligence Community Congestion.”  
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President Harry Truman circled back to the issue of cooperation and created the Central 
Intelligence Group (CIG) to gather and produce intelligence between agencies; as the Cold War 
commenced, however, there was a need for a single agency to take command of covert actions.89 
Finally, in 1947, the CIA was created under the National Security Act to assume the roles of 
foreign intelligence collection, covert actions, and espionage, while continuing the roles and 
responsibilities of the CIG.90  
 The CIA was met with great resistance in the IC. Although Donovan never led the CIA or 
served as the director, his vision and personality were a part of the CIA. As the OSS became 
CIA, Donovan’s reputation and former actions were absorbed by the new organization. ONI, 
Army, and the FBI were staunchly opposed to the CIA, primarily due to Donovan’s intentions to 
take control and assume power within the USIC.91 The three intelligence agencies banded 
together and produced a document to the White House to convince Roosevelt that the creation of 
the CIA was unnecessary.92 The organizations argued the espionage mission set was well 
covered and the cooperation between each other remained productive.93 The military went as far 
as to establish the Joint Intelligence Committee to coordinate military intelligence support in 
hopes of preventing Donovan from entering military matters.94 According to the 1949 Dulles 
Report, which reviewed the CIA’s impact as a centralized intelligence apparatus, the CIA 
admitted it struggled to work out differences in national coordination directives with the Air 
Force and Navy.95 Ultimately, the military services and the FBI were disappointed and 
                                                 
89 Tim Weiner, Legacy of Ashes: The History of the CIA, (New York: Random House, 2007). 
90 Brent Durbin, “US Intelligence and the Early Cold War, 1947-1953,” in The CIA and the Politics of US 
Intelligence Reform, (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2017). 




95 Durbin, “US Intelligence and the Early Cold War, 1947-1953.” 
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concerned when the CIA began operations, especially since the agency had a deliberately vague 
responsibility of power.  
The CIA received the most opposition from the FBI. Hoover despised Donovan’s OSS 
and looked for ways to hinder the CIA’s beginning years.96 The primary reasons for Hoover’s 
hatred extended from his own desire to expand the Bureau’s power in foreign intelligence and 
protect the FBI’s Latin American intelligence collection department, the Special Intelligence 
Services (SIS).97 The SIS acted as a undercover spy and counterintelligence department in 
Central and South America.98 By the end of World War II, the department uncovered hundreds 
of Axis agents and took control of 24 secret Axis radio stations.99 In Hoover’s mind, the SIS 
provided the basic framework and proven track record for a covert, foreign intelligence agency, 
eliminating the need for the CIA.100 Although the majority were burned by the FBI in frustration, 
the remaining SIS files were eventually handed over to OSS and eventually CIA, creating a 
narrative that the CIA was benefitting from years of FBI work and analysis.101 Additionally, 
Hoover claimed the CIA housed many Soviet spies.102 Due to Hoover’s vocal suspicion of Soviet 
penetration in the CIA, the executive branch and other IC members began to question the 
organization’s production of intelligence, frustrating the CIA.103 
 During the early years of the Cold War, the CIA kept most of its covert and foreign 
espionage activities from the USIC. The organization served as centralized intelligence 
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disseminator and product producer. Although the agency communicated with other IC members, 
its mission set often involved espionage and covert actions with foreign intelligence agencies, 
such as MI-6 in the United Kingdom. Since the CIA mission set is unique, IC agencies had few 
interactions with the organization, most of which were positive. In 1949, intelligence analysts 
debated the Communist threat in Korea and the necessity for American troops.104 The CIA, in 
agreement with Navy and Air Force personnel, correctly assessed that troop withdraw from the 
Korean peninsula would result in an eminent attack from the North.105 Army’s intelligence 
notoriously disputed CIA’s assessment but the disagreement did not appear to cause any friction 
in their relationship, both present and future.106 In the 1950s, the Soviet Navy underwent rapid 
technological advances, to include nuclear-powered, missile-armed, and torpedo-armed 
submarines.107 During this time of great concern for the Navy, the CIA provided information 
through clandestine sources to ONI and conducted analysis on Soviet naval weapons capabilities, 
ensuring the United States Navy maintained readiness. Additionally, during the Cuban missile 
crisis, the CIA launched numerous covert U-2 surveillance flights to monitor Soviet movements 
in Cuba.108 The organization provided U-2 photos of surface-to-air-missiles, fighter jets, and 
armed patrol boats to the DIA to verify their readiness, which provided key insights for defense 
leadership.109 At times, however, there was tension. In 1961, the organization was angered over 
the creation of the DIA, seen by some as an agency created after the CIA’s failure during the Bay 
of Pigs.110 The following year, the NRO was established, taking control of the CIA’s fledging 
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covert satellite program.111 Both of these sudden changes alarmed the agency as it demonstrated 
the growing power and independence of other IC members. 
 Intelligence agencies initially resisted the creation of the CIA, resulting in conflictual 
moments but over time the USIC adapted to the organization. The majority of the strained 
relationships derived from Donovan’s approach of controlling all intelligence production in the 
United States. Although he did not head the CIA, Donovan’s aggression created distrust among 
agencies. Organizations did not wish to concede mission sets or lose resources. Directors were 
alarmed by Donovan’s ability to have the ear of the president and incessantly suggest 
restructuring American intelligence. If he could do it, others could as well. The Army, Navy, and 
FBI agreed on the premise of the CIA, to centralize and coordinate between agencies, but 
disagreed on the organization’s strength and foreign intelligence focus.112 Over the course of 
time, the USIC understood the agency to be a necessary ally to not only foster cooperation but to 
specialize in covert action. Though at times the secrecy of the organization and predisposition to 
operate outside the IC was frustrating, the majority of the friction dissipated after the first few 
years, leading to strategic partnerships.   
Creation of the National Security Agency: 1952 
 There has long been a signals intelligence force in the United States. In 1917, the Army 
created a Cipher Bureau to look at radio communications intelligence during World War I.113 
Prior to World War II, the Army created the Signal Intelligence Service (Army SIS) as a larger 
replacement for the Cipher Bureau.114 The Navy, on the other hand, had its own, separate 
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cryptographic unit known as the Code and Signal Section.115 The group became renowned in the 
1930s for intercepting Japanese naval code and predicting maneuvers before they occurred.116 
Secondary to the more experience British intelligence agencies, the Army and Navy 
cryptographic teams disclosed a host of timely information to the Allies during World War II, 
showcasing their enormous value.117 At this time, signal intelligence (SIGINT) provided the 
most reliable information in the USIC and uncovered the most intelligence on Axis, and later 
Soviet, intentions.118 The Army and Navy’s SIGINT sections, however, did not communicate.119 
To remedy the issue of cooperation, the government combined both SIGINT departments and 
formed the Armed Forces Security Agency (AFSA) in 1949.120 Although the agency addressed 
the needs of the military, it did not take into account the national security aspect of SIGINT.121 In 
1952, NSA replaced the AFSA to unite military SIGINT, non-military SIGINT, and 
communications intelligence (COMINT).122   
 NSA had the luxury of inheriting an agency with a successful history and capable 
analysts but lagged behind in the national security sector.123 The organization started slow in 
learning a new mission set. In a few short years, the IC heavily relied on the NSA.124 The CIA 
could not infiltrate the Soviet Union through traditional clandestine methods and struggled to 
establish agent networks.125 According to a 1955 report to President Dwight Eisenhower, the 
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CIA admitted they “obtain little significant information from classical covet operations inside 
Russia.”126 The NSA was a welcomed lifeline to American collection efforts.  
Not only did NSA supplement knowledge on the Soviet Union, the agency shared its 
intelligence.127 During the 1950s, NSA broke high-level Russian ciphers and disseminated the 
timely intelligence to the CIA and service agencies.128 The CIA, still severely limited in its 
traditional capabilities, worked with the NSA to fill intelligence gaps by establishing a vital 
relationship.129 For the military, SIGINT provided information on Soviet bomber readiness, air 
defense, air order of battle, weapons capabilities, and aircraft communications, all of which were 
paramount intelligence for the United States Air Force.130 By 1957, the agency located 320 
Soviet fighter aircraft and 61 bomber regiments through signals analysis.131 NSA also worked 
with Navy submarines to covertly collect Soviet naval signals near ports and in territorial 
waters.132 The Army benefitted from insight on troop and supply movements, especially in 
Korea.133 Additionally, NSA assisted with NRO production in the 1960s. Reconnaissance 
satellites were limited in focus and the development of the photos delayed the time relevance of 
the intelligence.134 Coupled with signals analysis, NRO depended on NSA for real-time data and 
collaborated with the agency to produce valuable, multi-source intelligence products, to include 
imagery supplements.135 In 1964, NSA partnered with DIA to create the Defense Special Missile 
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and Aerospace Center, a missile and space intelligence defense organization.136 The intelligence 
center provides alerts, assessments, analysis, and reporting on missile and air activity, primarily 
based on SIGINT and COMINT collection, to the entire USIC.  
The NSA had a less-than-favorable experience with the FBI. In 1939, the Army SIS 
broke a series of Soviet codes; codename VENONA, which was one of the highest kept secrets 
in the nation.137 In the early 1950s, AFSA, and later NSA, wished to inform President Truman of 
their discovery but were discouraged by Hoover.138 Against his desire, the CIA were read into 
the program in 1952.139 Many of the decrypts were between Moscow and intelligence agents in 
the United States, which arguably fell within the FBI’s mission set. Hoover likely viewed the 
involvement of other IC agencies and the executive branch as a threat to the Bureau’s dominance 
in domestic counterintelligence. To prevent others from taking over the intelligence goldmine, 
Hoover did not wish to communicate and share with others. An FBI mole, however, leaked the 
discovery of VENONA to a Soviet handler and Moscow quickly changed its codes, losing one of 
the most prominent sources of intelligence.140 Many blamed Hoover for not protecting the 
program and not disseminating crucial intelligence to other IC partners.  
The creation of the NSA resulted in a near instant impact and greatly benefited the USIC. 
Admittedly, the organization was set up for success given that it acquired an established signals 
agency with decades of experience and seasoned professionals. Many of the growing pains 
associated with new IC agencies did not occur with NSA. Additionally, there was hardly any 
friction with other organizations, due in part to leadership’s determination to remain in the 
                                                 
136 Richard Bernard, “Telemetry Intelligence (TELINT) During the Cold War,” Center for Cryptologic History, 
(2016), https://www.nsa.gov/Portals/70/documents/about/cryptologic-heritage/historical-figures-
publications/publications/misc/telint-9-19-2016.pdf.  
137 Andrew, “The Cold War and the Intelligence Superpowers.”. 
138 Ibid. 
139 Ibid. 
140 Ibid.  
 
 22 
shadows. There was relatively no competition between other agencies for two primary reasons. 
First, NSA acts as a collector of intelligence and provides the data to the USIC. The agency may 
own the data but NSA hands-over the data to other agencies to conduct or evaluate the problem 
set for a long period of time. The mission of the NSA is to collect, translate if necessary, and 
disseminate to partners who require the intelligence to produce products and conduct analysis. 
Secondly, NSA is so advanced in cryptology that no agency could ever surpass its ability. 
Decades of technical knowledge coupled with numerous key SIGINT collects solidified the 
agency as the only organization capable to carry out the mission set. Consequently, the IC not 
only needed NSA but they welcomed its intelligence and constantly sought out assistance from 
the agency. Unlike the FBI, the directors of NSA chose to operate outside the public eye and not 
compete for recognition within the IC. As a result, the NSA began its early years as a crucial ally 
within the USIC and the epitome of collaboration, trust, cooperation, communication, and 
intelligence sharing.  
Creation of the Defense Intelligence Agency: 1961 
 In May 1960, a United States U-2 spy plane was shot down in Soviet airspace during a 
reconnaissance mission.141 The pilot, a CIA officer, was captured and detained, bringing 
international embarrassment to the USIC.142 President Dwight Eisenhower ordered the 
Kirkpatrick Joint Study Group, composed of senior intelligence officials from the State 
Department, CIA, and Department of Defense (DOD), to review the IC and provide 
recommendations for the “organization and management aspects of the foreign intelligence 
community.”143 The Group concluded the IC was not sufficiently addressing the rapid 
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technological advancements of the Soviet Union.144 Agencies were attacking pieces of the issue 
in certain areas on their own but lack a unified, coordinated approach. The CIA, created several 
years prior, was struggling to centralize all intelligence.145 Additionally, the CIA’s effort did not 
include military intelligence due to the services’ unique, warfighting focus.146 A former DIA 
director claimed the agency was “founded in frustration.”147 Although the Group did not mention 
a need to create a new organization, Secretary of Defense (SECDEF) Robert McNamara 
regarded the advice of the Group and officially formed the DIA on October 1, 1961.148  
 Formed to correct the IC’s disjointedness, the DIA experienced an identity crisis in its 
first few years. The organizational structure of the military was in disarray. The DIA started 
humbly with 25 people in a borrowed office space at the Pentagon, primarily working on 
estimative intelligence and requirement missions from other agencies.149 McNamara was 
determined to reorganize the intelligence architecture within the combat services, especially the 
Army which housed the most resources.150 The SECDEF syphoned resources from other 
agencies to develop DIA.151 In 1962, as part of McNamara’s Project 80, which commenced the 
wholesale restructure of the Army’s intelligence branch, over 1,000 Army spaces and over 700 
personnel were transferred to the DIA.152 The move angered many and resulted in the 
consolidation and absorption of many military mission sets into the new organization.153 The 
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relationship between the DIA and the intelligence branches of the services started poorly with 
many not trusting the DIA and viewing it as a bureaucratic obstacle.154 In 1963, the organization 
became equipped enough to become the military’s primary producer for intelligence, in 
particularly human intelligence (HUMINT).155 By 1968, the agency took control of defense 
attachés in other countries and housed over 6,000 employees producing intelligence on more 
than 100 nations.156  
 The DIA was met with resistance from both the DOD and the CIA. The FBI rarely 
interacted with the DIA due to the agencies differing mission sets. Unlike others in the IC, the 
Bureau did not involve themselves in military affairs and remained distant from many of the 
services. On the other hand, the Army and Navy viewed the agency as a hindrance and a burden, 
draining all their resources.157 The two branches were required by SECDEF to provide their 
personnel to DIA but, as an act of resistance, leadership typically transferred the least capable or 
problematic people.158 In the minds of leadership, the organization would likely not last as there 
had been many unsuccessful attempts over the years to create a body to centralize military 
intelligence.159 As a result, the DIA had a less-than qualified cadre of people in its beginning 
years.160 The Air Force, however, did cooperate and support DIA by providing trained 
personnel.161 Air Force had an abundance of intelligence analyst and were looking to reduce its 
workforce.162 There were also issues with the CIA. Not only were the two groups seemingly 
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crossing jurisdictions at times, but the CIA questioned the analysis of DIA, possibly due to sub-
par analysts.163 During the Vietnam War, the DIA consistently differed with the CIA on the 
number of enemy troop in South Vietnam, frustrating not only the agency directors but the 
executive branch.164 Other missteps included incorrect assessments for the Operation Rolling 
Thunder, a 1965-1968 Vietnamese bombing campaign, and the inability to predict the Warsaw 
Pact’s invasion of Czechoslovakia in 1968.165  
 The creation of the DIA brought along challenges in the IC but it did not significantly 
impact or alter the institution. The agency was seen more as an annoyance; crippled by 
bureaucracy and growing pains. As is the case for many newly formed federal organizations, the 
instillation was rushed and staffed with poorly qualified applicants. The agency gained the 
reputation of a “little brother,” young, unexperienced, and exceeding its capabilities. Contrary to 
the FBI, there was little friction between other USIC agencies. There was little malice or 
competition between other organizations due to a necessary mission set of centralizing 
intelligence within the services. Additionally, the agency stayed within its mission set and did 
not attempt to cross into the domains of others. Over the years, the relationship between the 
service agencies and the CIA drastically improved and the DIA was seen as an essential partner 
that merged foreign and military intelligence components. Overall, the DIA filled a necessary 
void but was initially weighed down by ineptness and bureaucratic complexities.  
Discussion 
 In comparing the CIA, NSA, and DIA to the FBI, it is apparent that agencies share 
similar struggles in their beginning years. Intelligence organizations were not pleased in the 
                                                 





creation of a new agency, seeing it as a challenge to current mission sets and resources. Although 
NSA had a relatively smooth transition, the CIA, DIA, and FBI were all met with hostilities, seen 
as an unwelcomed central repository or unnecessary newcomer. Additionally, all were thrown 
into action shortly after establishment, whether it be World War I or the Cold War. 
Understandably, organizations at times faltered or struggled to assume their role. This at times 
led to others questioning their competence but mostly waned as the years progressed. 
The speed in which an agency operated well with others in the USIC corresponds with its 
ability to take ownership of its mission set. The CIA struggled to cooperate with all members in 
the early years but was accepted due to the shared understanding that covert action and foreign 
intelligence had to be an agency’s sole role. The NSA absorbed previous agencies that were well 
versed and established in signals intelligence. The IC recognized NSA’s mastery and quickly 
welcomed the expertise. After acquiring more adept analysts, the DIA earned the respect of the 
service branches and other agencies for its ability to conjoin all aspects of military intelligence. 
In regards to domestic intelligence and federal crime, the FBI was also seen as a valuable asset 
for its national reach. The FBI did not fully assimilate to the USIC in the early Cold War because 
the agency attempted to latch onto a foreign and international mission set. Hoover believed SIS 
would be his catalyst to jump into the non-domestic side of the IC but the CIA assumed the 
international department’s duties. As a result, the FBI floundered at times. The organization’s 
domestic intelligence on Communism was a valuable addition but Hoover desired to expand the 
FBI’s power and influence. He was desperate to find ways and means to integrate the FBI’s 
counterintelligence mission set with the USIC but he could not establish a permanent role, 
leaving the FBI at times outside the fray. Clawing to become the prevailing leader of the IC, the 
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FBI’s method of concealing information and pursuit to expand its mission set created friction and 
hindered analysis.  
When agencies respected the boundaries of other members and openly communicated, 
the respect was reciprocated. The CIA, after a rough start with all organizations, eventually 
accepted the services as an essential partner in covert action and steered clear from military 
operations. The NSA did not attempt to create its own production unit with their data but opted 
to disseminate the information to the necessary actors. The DIA corrected its DOD rift internally, 
allowing the services autonomy in certain areas, and worked with the CIA to integrate military 
intelligence with espionage and foreign intelligence. Both the CIA and FBI, however, were 
notorious for not communicating and respecting other IC members, including going over 
organizational leadership to the executive branch. Although Donovan never led an IC agency, he 
shared similar qualities as Hoover. Both were a stubborn leader with goals to overtake mission 
sets and expand the ability of their agency through executive authority. The two diverge in their 
tenure. Donovan was the founder of the OSS, a precursor agency, while Hoover managed the 
FBI for decades. Consequently, Donovan and his objectives were short-lived and did not 
continue with the CIA while Hoover’s actions and intentions persisted under his command for 
nearly 40 years. Donovan’s reputation briefly followed the CIA while Hoover continued to lead 
the FBI through his vision. Ultimately, Hoover had more opportunities to extend the FBI’s 
practice of crossing mission domains, encroaching on other’s duties, and aspiring to gain more 
authority in the IC. 
Remaining Questions 
 Although this paper adds to the scholarship regarding historical cooperation within the 
USIC, questions remain in the field of study. Until more files are declassified, it is difficult to 
 
 28 
assess the instances of collaboration during the Cold War. Though known events have been 
highlighted in previous sections of this paper, the extent of cooperation is ambiguous.  
Additionally, it is unclear how agencies interacted at the individual level. Intelligence sharing 
may differ at the lower-level compared to upper-management. The same can be asked about the 
FBI’s opinion on Hoover and his actions. There is scholarship showcasing the internal friction 
within Hoover’s FBI at the upper-level, but it is unclear if the conflict resulted in day-to-day 
restraints at the individual level. Overall, questions remain regarding the extent to which trust, 
communication, collaboration, cooperation, and intelligence sharing between analysts at IC 
agencies, especially the FBI, hindered everyday intelligence analysis between 1947 and 1969.  
Conclusion 
This research study examines a crucial point in the history of the USIC and the infancy of 
some of the most powerful members. To gain a more comprehensive understanding of 
cooperation, intelligence sharing, collaboration, communication, and trust in the IC, analysis of 
the beginning years uncovers trends. Issues developed long before 1947. The FBI’s temporary 
assignment during World War I presented an identity crisis, splitting its mission set into 
domestic law enforcement and counterintelligence. Rather than choosing one domain, Hoover 
pursued both and sought to expand the organization’s intelligence functions. The FBI is unique 
in this dilemma and consequently experienced an exclusive set of challenges.  
Although not all agencies are created in the same manner, the tension between the FBI 
and the IC primarily derived from the organization’s lack of cooperation and desire to overtake 
mission sets. Others in the USIC experienced the same struggles but worked to adapt to the 
needs of the establishment, something Hoover was unwilling to do during his tenure. The FBI is 
not the sole agency responsible for poor cooperation and collaboration. The relationship between 
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IC agencies in the early years of the Cold War were far from perfect but this was to be expected. 
Several changes occurred in a relatively short period of time. Members were mandated to adjust 
and agencies were established under vague guidance and limited resources.  
In looking at the history of other agencies, there was a distinct clash between the FBI and 
the IC. By straying away from its original mission set in the early years, the organization 
frustrated others. The initial purpose of the organization addressed a void in law enforcement, 
but the mission sets adopted after both world wars overlapped with existing jurisdictions. 
Consequently, there was no need for the agency to morph into an intelligence apparatus. By 
blending into the domain of other USIC partners, friction arose. Another issue, unique to the 
agency, was a long-serving director with a large personality. Hoover aspired to expand the power 
of the FBI and did so through backdoor relationships. The director had the ability to charm and 
manipulate presidents and attorney generals into allowing his agency to expand its reach and 
power. Weaving his way through the twist and turns of politics in Washington, Hoover utilize 
those in power to protect his agency and mandate the Bureau’s position in the USIC. Rather than 
working with other organizations and leaders, Hoover often went over their heads and 
encouraged the executive branch to initiate change to benefit the Bureau. The IC and its leaders 
were very frustrated with Hoover’s approach and viewed his lack of open cooperation as a hurdle 
for collaboration. As a result, many did not share intelligence or communicate with Hoover or 
the FBI. 
The analysis and themes of this paper extend far beyond 1969. The issues persisted in the 
IC and resulted in disastrous events, culminating on September 11, 2001. This research study 
explores the origins of the USIC, the intended mission of agencies, early case work, and 
relationship with others. Although I highlight a previous era, the lessons learned can still be 
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applied today. The FBI evolved into a ubiquitous organization, straddling two mission sets. 
Although the agency formally established an intelligence department in 2004, certain issues 
discussed in this research study remain between the FBI and the USIC.166 Therefore, it is of the 
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